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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Plaintiff replies to the Brief of Appellees, James T. 
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen (hereinafter "Jensens"), as 
follows (the other defendants are referred to herein as "the 
Corporate defendant and Killion"): 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE 
EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF 
ITS ASSETS WITHOUT TIME LIMITATION. 
The Jensens' argument is a simple one: Plaintiff was 
dissolved in 1965 and is now legally dead and cannot sue to protect 
its assets because as they state at page 22 of their brief "30 
years Is Too Long for a Corporation to 'Wind Up7 Its Affairs." 
In so stating Jensens appear to agree with plaintiff that 
the rule in Utah in accordance with the Utah statutes and cases, is 
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that a dissolved corporation retains title to its assets and can 
sue to protect them. Apparently Jensens take the position that if 
the corporation takes too long in winding up its affairs that the 
assets cease to belong to the corporation and pass automatically to 
the shareholders as tenants in common. 
The trouble with this position is that there is no 
support for it in the law, and it would be a bad rule. 
Jensens cite no case law supporting the foregoing 
proposition. Jensens do cite as authority for their position, two 
cases from other jurisdictions, Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265, 281 
P.2d 483 (1955) ; and Kirby Royalties. Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 461 P.2d 
282 (Wyo. 1969). These cases held that the assets of dissolved 
corporation pass immediately upon dissolution to the shareholders. 
That position is directly contrary to the Utah statute and cases 
interpreting it. 
Jensens cite as additional authority for their position 
three cases from other jurisdictions, Levy v. Lieblincr, 238 F.2d 
505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert, denied, 353 U. S. 936; Jenot v. White 
Mountain Acceptance Corp. . 124 N.H. 701, 474 A.2d 1382 (1984); and 
Hampton v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co.. 107 N.H. 89, 218 A.2d 442 
(1966). These cases all held that the assets of the dissolved 
corporation pass to the shareholders not upon dissolution, but 
rather upon the expiration of the relevant 2 or 3 year winding up 
statute. If Utah had a winding up statute with a time limitation, 
those case might be persuasive, but that is not the case. 
Utah's winding up statute was without any time limitation 
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and was found at Sec, 16-10-101 UCA: 
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation...the 
corporate existence of such corporation shall 
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its 
affairs in respect to any property and assets which have 
not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to 
such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah also had a separate 2 year survival of remedy 
statute which is found at Sec. 16-10-100 UCA which provided: 
"The dissolution of a corporation...shall not take away 
or impair any remedy available to or against the 
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, 
for any right or claim existing, or any liability 
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other 
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after 
the date of such dissolution. Any such action or 
proceeding by or against the corporation may be 
prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its 
corporate name..." 
If winding up under Sec. 16-10-101 UCA were in some way 
limited to the two year period of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA, there would 
be no need for Sec. 16-10-101 UCA. The two sections were clearly 
not intended to be repetitious. Sec. 16-10-100 UCA speaks of 
remedies by or against the corporation relating to a "right or 
claim existing" or "liability incurred" "prior" to dissolution. 
Sec. 16-10-101 speaks in terms of the "property and assets" of the 
dissolved corporation. It appears clear that Sec. 16-10-100 UCA 
was intended to deal with claims and liabilities arising before 
dissolution and existing between the corporation and third parties. 
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It appears that Sec. 16-10-101 UCA was intended to deal with the 
with issues of property and assets of the corporation (and 
specifically allowing the corporation to sue and be sued with 
regard thereto without limitation of time), and thus appears to 
have been intended to relate to matters (1) between the corporation 
and its shareholders as well as (2) to third party claims and 
liabilities (relating to said assets and property) arising after 
dissolution. The interpretation appears to be supported fully by 
the current version of said Sec. 16-10-100 UCA which appears to be 
set forth in Sections 16-10a-1406 and 1407 UCA. (These sections 
establish two survival of remedy time periods, one of 120 days and 
another of 5 years, depending upon the kind of notice given.) The 
foregoing interpretation also seems to be borne out by Holman v. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. 905 P.2d 895 (Utah App 1995) which 
dealt with a claim arising after dissolution, and not with an asset 
owned by the dissolved corporation at dissolution. 
Jensens appear to agree that the 2 year survival of 
remedy statute is not a winding up statute. Although Jensens at 
page 28 of their brief, argue that title to the subject property 
passed to the shareholders immediately upon dissolution or at the 
expiration of the 2 year statute, at page 23 of their brief they 
concede that Sec. 16-10-101 UCA extends beyond the 2 year period of 
Sec. 16-10-100, if the activity relates to "winding up." 
Thus even the Jensens admit that the Utah 2 year survival 
statute does not trigger any automatic conveyance of corporate 
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assets to the shareholders, and the foregoing out-of-state cases 
are clearly not in point• 
Jensens appear to take the position that the automatic 
transfer of assets comes some time later - apparently after the 
corporation has had a "reasonable" opportunity to "wind up" its 
affairs. 
The notion that we need a court-created automatic 
transfer of assets to the shareholders after a reasonable winding 
up period is fallacious for at least the following reasons: 
1. NO STATUTORY OR CASE SUPPORT. There appears to be no 
statutory or case support therefore in this jurisdiction or 
elsewhere. 
2. VESTING TITLE IN SHAREHOLDERS AT A FIXED TIME CREATES 
CONFUSION. In our original brief we itemize numerous problems 
inherent in vesting title to corporate assets in the shareholders, 
for example numerous shareholders resulting in numerous tenants in 
common would be a nightmare. Also the problem of missing 
shareholders cannot be minimized. Shareholders may have moved 
without forwarding addresses, or died, or even worse the stock may 
have become street stock. Shall we adopt a policy that these 
missing persons shall be declared tenants in common? 
3. VESTING TITLE IN SHAREHOLDERS AT AN UNCERTAIN TIME IS 
EVEN WORSE. Any scheme that vests the title to assets in the 
shareholders whether early or late, simply creates confusion and 
uncertainty. Introducing an additional time element only makes it 
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worse. Shall the courts legislate a time? Shall it be after a 
reasonable winding up period? Shall the time be the same for all 
cases or shall it depend on the facts of the case? If the court 
arbitrarily picks a time applicable to all cases, is that not 
judicial legislation? If vesting in the shareholders depends upon 
the facts of the case, no one will ever be able to deal with the 
assets of such a corporation with any assurance in the absence of 
a lawsuit. Shall we deal with the dissolved corporation or shall 
be deal with the shareholders? In each case, until a court has 
ruled on what a reasonable period of time is with respect to a 
particular corporation, no one will ever know if it is safe to deal 
with the corporation of if one must deal with all of the 
shareholders, and they cannot all be found, then what? 
Reasonableness of winding up may be an issue of law as 
claimed by Jensens if the facts are not in dispute. In this case 
the facts behind winding up are not only disputed, they have never 
been presented. A question of fact exists here which precludes 
summary judgment in any event. 
4. THE UTAH STATUTORY PROVISION PROVIDING THAT THE 
ASSETS REMAIN IN THE CORPORATION WITHOUT LIMITATION OF TIME IS 
BEST. The Utah legislature and cases interpreting our statutes 
have clearly favored the view the corporation retains its assets 
without limitation of time. The current provision found at Sec. 
16-10a-1405 UCA couldn't be more explicit in stating that a 
dissolved corporation retains its assets. It states in 
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subparagraph (2) that "Dissolution of a corporation does not; 
fa) transfer title to the corporations property". There is no 
limitation of time. Although the earlier statute was not as 
explicit perhaps, nevertheless the same rule is clearly inherent in 
the former statute found at Sec. 16-10-101 UCA which gave the 
corporation power to "sell or otherwise dispose of such property 
and assets." It thereby clearly spelled out that the corporation 
retains title to its assets. If the shareholders became tenants in 
common of the property, then the corporation would not have power 
to sell or dispose of the assets, that power would be in the 
shareholders. As noted in our original brief the said statute was 
thus interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Falconaero 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 
P2d 915 (1964), and McKay & Knobel Enter., Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, 
Inc. , 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969). Jensens attempt to 
distinguish Falconaero by claiming that perhaps it occurred within 
the 2 years period of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA. Had that been the fact, 
or had the court wished to somehow limit Sec. 16-10-101 UCA by the 
2 year provision of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA, it could surely have done 
so« Since the court did neither, it is improper at this time to 
try to do so retroactively. 
We believe the position adopted by our legislature is the 
correct one, the only one that really makes sense, and the only one 
that brings any stability to titles. The corporation must be able 
to. retain title to its assets, and it must be able to dispose of 
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them and protect them until they are disposed of, no matter when 
that may occur. If the corporation is dilatory in this, if it is 
acting improperly in any way, the shareholders can certainly sue 
the corporation for relief. 
5. THE CURRENT STATUTE SEC. 16-10a-1405 UCA IS 
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. Not only does the current statute only 
restate what has been our law, but the current statute, by its own 
terms, appears to be applicable to this case. Sec. 16-10a-1701 UCA 
provides that the Chapter 10a of Title 16 (and therefore Sec. 16-
10a-1405 UCA) applies "to all domestic corporations in existence on 
July 1. 1992." (Emphasis added.) For the reasons stated above, we 
believe that plaintiff was "in existence" on July 1, 1992, for the 
purposes of disposing of its assets. 
The rule contended for by defendant is without support in 
the law and is impractical and unworkable. 
POINT 2. A FACT ISSUE ON FRAUD EXISTS PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Jensens attempted to influence the court below that 
plaintiff's claim is without merit in any case because the 
shareholders gave quit claim deeds - so no harm done even if the 
court rules against plaintiff for an erroneous reason. Plaintiff 
claimed below that the deeds were invalid and were obtained by 
fraud. The lower court made no ruling on this matter, but may have 
been influenced in its ruling nevertheless. 
The Jensens have attempted the same tactic here. They 
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have devoted a good part of their brief to the matter of the quit 
claim deeds. 
At page 27 of their brief, Jensens appear to complain 
that plaintiff has not enlightened anyone about the quit claim deed 
fraud as claimed by them. On a motion for summary judgment and 
upon the state of the record, plaintiff's allegation of fraud must 
be taken as true, and a further delineation thereof at this stage 
is not necessary. Nevertheless, plaintiff has no problem in going 
further and the substance of plaintiff's claims in this regard is 
as follows: 
Jensens through their agents sought out the said 
shareholders and obtained said quit claim deeds by 
misrepresentation of the fact that the said shareholders did not 
own any interest in the subject Amis No. 1 claim, and that 
therefore there was no harm in giving the deeds. Grantors were 
paid $25.00 each for their trouble, notwithstanding the said mining 
claim is a very valuable claim. If Jensens meant by their 
representations that the shareholders had no interest in Amis No. 
1 as it was owned by the corporation, then there would have been 
no fraud perhaps. But it would be highly fraudulent for them to 
claim that the shareholders had no interest in the property (in the 
sense that the corporation owned the claim) and to now claim that 
the shareholders really owned it after all. In fact, Jensens knew 
that plaintiff (or its shareholders) owned the property. 
Thereafter, the corporate defendant and Killion through 
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their agents approached plaintiff to acquire said claims and 
advised that the tracts in question had never been deeded out of 
plaintiff. Plaintiff was unaware of that fact until then. That 
was therefore the first they knew that they had been defrauded by 
Jensens. 
For their part, the corporate defendant and Killion got 
the record title changed by obtaining and recording a deed from a 
totally separate corporation having the name "Salt Lake Investment 
Company," and since the recorder was unaware that it was the wrong 
Salt Lake Investment Company changed the ownership on the record. 
This later Salt Lake Investment Company owned nothing regarding the 
three claims and could give nothing. 
Admittedly the foregoing is the position of plaintiff, 
and plaintiff and all defendants should have their day in court on 
these issues, and that is the very purpose of this action to quiet 
title to the subject claims in an action naming all of the parties 
and to thus have a court of law pass on these allegations once and 
for all. This entire endeavor has been improperly thwarted. 
POINT 3. PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND, 
AND NO FORMAL MOTION TO AMEND WAS NECESSARY. 
The decision of the lower court acknowledges that 
plaintiff had the right to wind up, but apparently the thinking of 
the lower court was that there could be no fact situation that 
would allow a dissolved corporation to go to court relating to any 
act of winding up after 30 years. 
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Jensens argued in the lower court as they do here that 
the assets passed to the shareholders. The lower court did not so 
rule. This creates a dilemma: 
A. If the lower court felt that time barred plaintiff's 
action but that the shareholders did not receive title, then it was 
perhaps correct in not allowing plaintiff to amend. But if 
plaintiff cannot sue or be sued under Sec. 16-10-101 UCA because of 
the lapse of time, then is not plaintiff also barred from selling 
or otherwise disposing of its assets because the right to dispose 
of its assets is also covered under said Sec. 16-10-101 UCA. 
It makes little sense to say the dissolved corporation 
can deed its properties or give a disclaimer to clarify title or 
whatever and then to say it cannot sue. 
If a dissolved corporation can sell its assets, but 
cannot sue, then what if it sells its assets on time, and the buyer 
defaults. Cannot the corporation sue on the note? or foreclose if 
necessary? If plaintiff can't transfer its assets what is to 
become of them? 
B. On the other hand if the lower court felt that the 
assets passed to the shareholders, then the court should have 
allowed plaintiff to amend to join them. 
Jensens claim in a footnote at page 12 of their brief 
that plaintiff did not make a formal motion to amend. It was and 
still is plaintiff's position that the assets of plaintiff belong 
to plaintiff and not to the shareholders, and that plaintiff can 
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sue to defend its assets at any time. Plaintiff therefore did not 
want to amend as a first choice and did not think it necessary to 
formally so move to amend. The motion to amend was an alternative 
position, and therefore no formal motion to amend was made. The 
matter was clearly raised below, and this court should look to 
substance over form. 
POINT 4. FAILURE TO GRANT ORAL ARGUMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
At page 12 of their brief, Jensens assert that plaintiff 
has not shown that lack of oral argument would have brought about 
a different result. That is not plaintiff's constitutional burden, 
anymore than it would be for a person wrongfully denied a jury 
trial, to prove that a jury had he been allowed one would have 
acquitted him. If one has a right to oral argument then one has a 
right to it without condition or excuse. The reasons for oral 
argument are numerous, but not the least is the right to attempt to 
convince the judge emotionally as well as intellectually in a face 
to face exchange. It is presumed that such an exchange is 
beneficial. 
It is true that if this court finds that plaintiff's 
position is correct on the law, and this court reverses, the 
omission of oral argument will be corrected. But still the proper 
processes of the law should have be followed to minimize the 
expense of appeals. 
Finally, in matters involving lower court discretion 
adversely effecting an appellant, oral argument is an essential 
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part of the exercise of that discretion. If the appellate court 
finds abuse of discretion in such a case, presumably that would 
correct the error, but to affirm the exercise of lower court 
discretion in absence of mandated oral argument is clearly 
improper. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the 
District Court as it relates to Jensens and the corporate defendant 
and Killion should be reversed, and this action remanded for trial 
on all issues and as to all parties. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument of this 
appeal. 
Dated this &> day of July, 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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Two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants 
were mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage 
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Derek Langton 
Attorney for Defendants Jensen 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
Attorney for the Corporate Defendant and Killion, 
Mountain Fuel East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7 
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